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ABSTRACT
This study investigates correlations  between board characteristics 
and firm performances.  For  this purpose, six board characteristics 
were chosen: (1) equilibrium between non-executive and executive 
members of the board of directors; (2) independence of board 
members; (3) selection of board members by the assistant role of 
the Nomination Committee; (4) training the members’ competences; 
(5) remuneration policy of board members by the assistant role of 
the Remuneration Committee; (6) improuving the accountability 
and transparency of financial information by the assistant role of 
the Audit Committee. The financial performances are represented 
by Return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. The present study sample 
consists of 55 Romanian non-financial companies which are listed on 
the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) in 2012. We found the following 
characteristics in the majority of boards of directors:  equilibrium 
between non-executive and executive members,  independence 
of the members and concerns on training  competences. On the 
other hand, the majority  of companies  do  not  have,  within their 
governance system, advisory committees (such as Nomination, 
Remuneration or Audit Committees), which are meant to help the 
board in its decision-making. No statistically significant association 
was found between any of the board characteristics and performances 
represented either by Tobin’s Q or ROA, but the findings are in line with 
numerous studies conducted in developing countries and may be 
explained by various shortcomings which characterise the lagging 
of transition economies.
1. Introduction
Romania is one of the emerging European countries which belong to the former communist 
bloc, together with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Germany. In 1989, changes occurred in Eastern Europe which mark the exit of these coun-
tries from communism. This period marked the recovery of these countries from a major 
setback, as compared to other democratic countries in Europe. Since 1989, Romania has 
faced a complex process of internal transformation, in order to achieve a functioning market 
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economy. Her accession to the European Union on 1 January 2007 required a restructuring 
of the economy from its roots, including the adoption of good corporate practice stipulated 
in the 2006/46/EC Directive, which mentions the obligation of companies operating in the 
EU space to report a ‘corporate governance statement’ (statement of conformity to 2006/46/
EC Directive), the so-called ‘Comply or Explain Statement’.
In Romania, the principles of good corporate governance were first adopted by the 
Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) in 2001, as the first Corporate Governance Code of the 
Bucharest Stock Exchange (CGC of BSE). The attempt failed because only one company 
adopted the code. Thus, in Romania, corporate governance could be talked about only from 
2008 when BSE adopted a second CGC, which is based on the OECD principles of corpo-
rate governance which is more consistent. The code came into existence in the financial 
year 2009 and it was voluntarily adopted by the companies trading in the regulated market 
operated by BSE. The companies that decide to entirely or partially adopt the code have the 
obligation to annually submit to BSE a statement of compliance or non-compliance with 
the CGC’s provisions (the ‘Comply or Explain Statement’), stating recommendations that 
were effectively implemented as well as the method of implementation.
The corporate governance framework should set out the respective functions of the 
board and their powers and responsibilities (OECD, 1999, 2004; Wirtz, 2011). Among the 
board’s important features with direct implications of successful corporate governance, the 
following can be mentioned: board duality, board size, board diversity, equilibrium between 
non-executive and executive members of the board of directors, independence of board 
members, selection and training of board members, the role of advisory committees such 
as Nomination, Remuneration or Audit Committees in the company’s governance, etc.
CGC of BSE (2008) based on 11 corporate governance regulatory pillars, such as: Article 1 
– Corporate governance framework; Article 2 – The shareholders and other financial instru-
ments holders’ rights; Article 3 – The role and duties of the board; Article 4 – Composition 
of the Board; Article 5 – Appointment of Directors; Article 6 – Remuneration of directors; 
Article 7 – Transparency, financial reporting, internal control and risk management; Article 
8: Conflicts of interests and related parties’ transactions; Article 9 – Treatment of corporate 
information; Article 10 – Corporate social responsibility; and Article 11 – Management and 
control systems. This code is similar to those adopted by other European Union member 
states and, as can be seen from the structure above, it provides great attention to the func-
tions of board directors as well as their powers and responsibilities. Since January 2016, a 
new CGC of BSE has come into force for the companies listed on the main market, but the 
results of applying it in practice will only be known in the future. The ultimate declarative 
goal of the CGC of BSE is to improve confidence in the listed companies by promoting 
positive developments in the corporate governance of these companies.
In Romania, since the principles of CGC were applied (1 January 2009), very few studies 
have investigated the relationship between board characteristics and financial performances 
(e.g., Gavrea, Stegerean, & Marin, 2012; Moscu, 2013). Moreover, as far as the authors can 
ascertain, no studies have used such a data source of ‘Comply or Explain Statements’ for 
this purpose.
Thus, the main research goal is to fill such a gap in literature by analysing the rela-
tionship between some board characteristics provided by the ‘Comply or Explain 
Statement’ (such as equilibrium between non-executive and executive members of the 
board of directors, independence of board members, selection of board members, training 
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the  members’  competences, the assistant role of the board provided by Nomination, 
Remuneration and Audit Committees) and financial performances of the Romanian listed 
companies.
The remaining part of the article is organised as follows: In section 2, the theoretical 
considerations were designed, according to which the main working hypotheses are stated. 
In section 3, the methodology and data sources were designed. Section 4 highlights the 
results and discussions of the main empirical findings. Finally, the article ends with the main 
conclusions and limits which could be the basis for future studies in this area of research.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
Adopting CGCs in emerging countries increases the interest in studying the impact of good 
corporate governance on business performance, in the context of social, economic and 
political factors which differ from those in developed countries (Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, & 
Hanuman, 2012).
From the perspective of the agency theory, effective corporate governance must har-
monise the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. As noted by Wirtz 
(2011), the board of directors is one of the governance mechanisms that has received the 
most attention in governance research. Therefore, various features related to board structure 
and board composition are considered in many studies as the main characteristics of an 
effective corporate governance being able to boost business performances (Al-Matari et al., 
2012; Achim & Borlea, 2013; Achim, Borlea, & Mare, 2016; Bathula, 2008; Brick, Palmon, & 
Wald, 2006; Brown, 2007; Fallatah & Dickins, 2012; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Frederick, 2011; 
Hsu & Wu, 2014; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Rad, Locke, & Reddy, 2012; Sonnenfeld, 2002; Tariq, 
2010; van Essen, van Oosterhout, & Carney, 2012).
2.1. Equilibrium between non-executive and executive members of the board of 
directors and firm performance
The principle of separating the management from ownership, on which the agency theory is 
based, is provided by OECD principles, as well as other CGCs in various countries. Hence, 
it was stipulated that members of the board of directors should not overlap with those of 
the executives, and the board of directors should include non-executive directors of a suffi-
cient number and calibre, in order to give them significant weight in the board’s decisions. 
Therefore, the existence of equilibrium between executive and non-executive directors in 
the board of directors is necessary, so that ‘no person or group of persons can dominate the 
board’s decision taking’ (Art. 4. Composition of the Board, Principle VI, CGC of Bucharest 
Stock Exchange, 2008, p. 8).
According to the agency theory, the presence of non-executive directors is seen as lead-
ing to better governance of the company because it would meet the supreme interests of 
the owners (shareholders) (Fama, 1980). Consequently, the duality role, where the chief 
executive officer (CEO) or managing director is also the chair of the board, represents a 
threat to a successful corporate governance.
Many other studies have highlighted the fact that non-duality leads to better performance 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983) and later Alexander, Fennell, and Halpern (1993) pointed out that 
CEO duality is a main factor which influences the company’s value.
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According to the above arguments, we intend to test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Equilibrium between non-executive and executive members of the board of direc-
tors positively influences firm performance.
2.2. Independence of board members and firm performance
Independence of board members requires that:
… an adequate number of non-executive directors shall be independent, in the sense that, 
they do not maintain, nor have recently maintained (directly or indirectly) any business 
relationships with the issuer or persons linked to the issuer, of such a significance as to influence 
their autonomous judgement. Renunciation to a term, by an independent director, shall be 
accompanied by an extensive, detailed statement regarding the reasons for such action. (Art. 
4. Composition of the Board, Principle VII, CGC of BSE, 2008, p. 8) 
Independence of board members can also be identified by the percentage of outside directors 
on the board. According to Cadbury’s (1992) report and the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (1999), independence of board members is considered a board of directors 
main feature.
The inside directors, as part of a company’s structure, have a better knowledge of the 
business and may provide useful company information while outside directors play a role 
of control over managerial decisions through skills, knowledge expertise and objectivity, to 
reduce the agency’s costs and to protect shareholders’ interest (Farinha, 2003).
Numerous studies have demonstrated a direct correlation between higher board mem-
bers’ independence (reflected by the higher percentage of outsiders/independent directors) 
and higher business performance (Black et al., 2015; Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2006).
Based on the above, the following hypotheses are formulated:
Hypothesis 2. Independence of board members positively influences firm performance.
2.3. Training the competences of board members and firm performance
In the literature, there are various studies documenting the importance of board members’ 
skills in executing a successful business. A clear part of the literature (Gouiaa & Zéghal, 2013; 
Johl, Kaur, & Cooper, 2015; Yusoff & Amrstrong, 2012) distinctly considered that ‘directors’ 
competencies,’ ‘qualified and experienced directors’ or ‘directors accounting expertise’ are 
‘board characteristics’ and investigated their relationship with financial performance. In 
order to highlight the complexity of skills that board members must have, Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003) introduced the notion of ‘board capital’ which includes both human capital 
(experience, expertise and reputation) and relational capital (network of ties to other firms 
and external contingencies). However, in the context of the present study, the views of those 
who considered these skills as ‘board characteristics’ were shared, even though in the opin-
ion of the authors of the present work, the two concepts are interchangeable.
In substantiation of Cadbury’s (1992) report in the UK, a study ordered by the UK gov-
ernment highlighted some competencies that UK directors must have, namely: integrity, 
listening skills, motivation of others, motivation, resilience, persuasiveness, decisiveness, 
determination, sensitivity and energy. Conducting a review of the literature on the role of the 
board of directors’ competencies in the smooth running of the business, Carter and Lorsch 
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(2004) concluded that managers who have varied skills in business will better understand the 
business environment and therefore will be able to exploit market opportunities. Directors 
should also possess skills specific to the company’s domain of activity.
Investigating the importance of board development practices in 713 US non-profit gov-
ernance, Brown (2007) showed that board development practices of recruitment and train-
ing are relevant to ensure high skills for the board members and these will lead to higher 
performance of the company in the future.
Furthermore, in his study, Yermack (2006) concluded that specific skills such as account-
ing and finance are required for board members in US companies and empirically found 
that share price reactions are sensitive to variables such as a ‘director’s occupation and 
professional qualifications’.
For New Zealand, Rad et al. (2012) investigated whether companies that have directors 
who are professional members of the Institute of Directors (IOD) perform better than 
companies that lack such directors. Their study revealed that the more educated and pro-
fessional the board members are, the more positively the business performance is affected. 
A broad study by Gouiaa and Zéghal (2013) conducted for Canadian firms, empirically 
shows that some board characteristics such as ‘qualified and experienced directors’ tend to 
reduce the average cost of capital.
In order to find the ‘effective board characteristics’ in Malaysia, Yusoff and Amrstrong 
(2012) conducted a survey based on a qualitative approach involving two stages of the Delphi 
Technique. They found that financial competencies received the highest responses, followed 
by corporate planning, business forecasting, legal, risk management, marketing, human 
resource and international business. Similarly, for Malaysia, Johl et al. (2015) considered 
‘directors’ accounting expertise’ to be among the board characteristics and, in their study 
conducted in Malaysia for 700 public listed firms for the year 2009, they found that board 
accounting/financial expertise are positively associated with firm performance (expressed 
by ROA).
Going further with the studies conducting in emerging countries in this field, some 
interesting findings (Wu, 2013; Yang, 2009) were obtained for Taiwan. Here, in order to 
encourage ‘continuous learning and training competences’ of directors and achieve board 
effectiveness, Taiwan Securities Exchange Corporation (TSEC) required a newly recruited 
director of TSEC listed companies to take a 12-hour training courses during the year of 
recruitment and a 3-hour course the following year and later during their tenure. Under 
this context, Yang (2009) investigated the relationship between board training hours and 
financial performance (measured by ROA, Return on Equity (ROE) and Earning per share 
(EPS) ) in Taiwan, but he did not find any significant relationship in the year 2008. However, 
a bit later, the empirical results of Wu (2013) showed that board training has a significant 
positive impact on the accounting-based measures of ROA, ROE and no significant effect 
on the market-based measures of Tobin’s Q and stock returns.
In Romania, the CGC of the BSE (2008) refers to the need to ensure the highest level 
of competence for board members and shows that ‘board members should continuously 
update skills and improve their knowledge of the company’s activities as well as the corporate 
governance best practices, in order to fulfil their leading role’ (Art. 4. Composition of the 
Board, Rec. 17, CGC of BSE, 2008, p. 9).
The above investigation intended to find whether the board training may lead to increase 
in financial performances and the following working hypothesis were stated:
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Hypothesis 3. The training of board members positively influences firm performance.
2.4. Selection of the board members and firm performance
Numerous studies have investigated the importance of the selection of board members to 
ensure high performance of the board (Brown, 2007; Frederick, 2011; Herman, Renz, & 
Heimovics, 1997; Makhlouf, Binti Laili, & Ali, 2014). In the OECD, corporate governance 
working papers, Frederick (2011) highlighted that there is no foolproof technique in the 
nomination process, but a key factor in increasing the quality of the process is to have clear 
procedures. He also pointed out that an independent nomination process boosts perfor-
mance of the board, even in the case of state-owned companies.
Various studies documented the main role of an independent Nomination Committee 
in assuring an efficient and independent selection process (Brown, 2007; Frederick, 2011; 
Herman et al., 1997; Makhlouf et al., 2014). Nomination Committees serve as an unbiased 
mechanism to select potential applicants. In addition, it is important for the CEO not to be a 
member of the Nomination Committee (Brown, 2007). For 713 US non-profit organisations, 
Brown (2007) found that a strong positive correlation between recruitment practices and 
perception of board members’ competency is a significant predictor of board performance. 
Reporting on developing countries, in Jordan, Makhlouf et al. (2014) considered among the 
board of director’s characteristics, the ‘existence of nominations and compensation com-
mittee’ and theorised a relationship between them and firms’ performance, in the industrial 
companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange.
OECD corporate governance principles require that for a rigorous and transpar-
ent recruitment, the board of directors will evaluate whether it is possible to compile a 
Nomination Committee consisting of its members and of independent directors. The 
Nomination Committee will coordinate the process of board members’ appointment and 
recommend the board to propose candidates for the leading position. To ensure high-level 
competence for board members, an important role is played by the selection process of the 
board members. The selection of board members is a prerequisite to ensure effective board 
structure. According to the BSE Code (2008), ‘the appointment of directors should be a 
formal, rigorous and transparent procedure. Such procedure will establish objective criteria 
and ensure regular adequate information on the personal and professional qualification of 
the candidates’ (Art. 5 Appointment of directors, Principle IX and X, CGC of Bucharest 
Stock Exchange, 2008, p. 9). Establishment of a Nomination Committee consisting of inde-
pendent members is representative of an adequate remuneration policy (Brown, 2007).
Following the study of Makhlouf et al. (2014) and the literature review on the relation-
ship between the appointment of directors and firm performance, the following working 
hypothesis is stated:
Hypothesis 4. The existence of nomination committee positively influences the firm performance.
2.5. Remuneration policy and firm performance
The remuneration policy of both directors and executive managers has an influence on the 
managers and directors’ interest in the company’s activity. The conflict of interests deter-
mined by the separation between ownership and control (on which the agency theory is 
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based) can lead to managers (agents) adopting an opportunistic behaviour that does not 
necessarily agree with the shareholders’ interests (as principals) of wealth maximisation. 
Thus, managers are inclined to moral hazard and opportunistic behaviour guided by their 
own interests.
In the literature, the agency theory developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) was ana-
lysed from two perspectives: Firstly, the research conducted to determine the relationship 
between executive managers’ compensation and company performance, revealed that there 
is indeed a positive relationship between the two of them (Brick et al., 2006; Ozkan, 2007). 
Secondly, several studies conducted in order to assess the effects that bonuses have on the 
managers’ behaviour showed that the share-based bonuses stimulated excessive risk-taking 
in the banking sector, representing a possible factor that provoked the financial crisis in 
2008 (Bebchuk & Spamann, 2010).
To find solutions to this conflict, the OECD regulations (2004) on corporate governance, 
referred to the remuneration of board members:  ‘An entity shall disclose the remuneration 
policy for directors and managers as well as information on board members, including 
their qualifications, and selection process.’ Consequently, CGCs introduced major sections 
designed to regulate remuneration and other benefits granted to directors and managers. 
The role of the Remuneration Committee is also well-stated.
The CGC of BSE (2008) also has similar provisions, showing that the company ‘will 
secure the services of good quality directors and executive managers by means of a suita-
ble remuneration policy that is compatible with the long-term interests of the company’. 
In this regard, the board of directors will establish a Remuneration Committee, consisting 
of its members, to develop a remuneration policy for directors and managers which will 
establish internal rules. The Remuneration Committee ‘shall be exclusively composed of 
non-executive directors and will have a sufficient number of independent directors’ (Art. 
6 Remuneration of directors, Principle XI, Rec. 22. CGC of Bucharest Stock Exchange, 
2008, p. 10).
The existence of an independent Remuneration Committee is meant to mitigate conflicts 
between shareholders and managers and to establish the best remuneration package for the 
director to improve the firm performances. Various studies document the main role of the 
Remuneration Committee and found a positive relationship between this and firm perfor-
mances (Carter & Zamora, 2008; Kato, Kim, & Lee, 2007; Lee, Lev, & Yeo, 2008; Makhlouf 
et al., 2014). Thus, Carter and Zamora (2008) provided empirical findings on the effects 
of the role of remuneration policy and the vote in remuneration committee in setting pay 
packages for directors, in order to get the best financial performances. Kato et al. (2007) 
found a positive relationship between cash compensation of executives and Korea stock 
market performance. Lee et al. (2008) reported that the dispersion of directors compen-
sation is positively associated with the firm performances which is reflected by Tobin’s Q. 
Müller (2014), in his survey conducted on sample companies listed in the London Stock 
Exchange for 2010–2011, found a significant relationship between some ‘board compen-
sation characteristics’ such as non-executive directors’ basic fee, fees paid in shares and 
additional remuneration for board committee, and firm performances of ROA. In Jordan, 
Makhlouf et al. (2014) considered among the board of director’s characteristics, the ‘exist-
ence of nominations and compensation committee’ and theorised a relationship between 
them and firms’ performance of industrial companies listed in the Amman Stock Exchange. 
In the same view, Waithaka, Gakure, and Wanjau (2013) considered some variables such as 
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‘directors’ remuneration’ together with the ‘existence of board committees’ to be among the 
‘board characteristics’ variables in their study which investigated the relationship between 
board characteristics and performances in Kenya.
In the context of the present study and based on the review of literature in the field, the 
directors’ remuneration may be considered as a board characteristics, to formulate the 
following working hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. The existence of Remuneration Committee positively influences the firm 
performance.
2.6. Audit committee and firm performances
The Cadbury (1992) report outlines the role of an Audit Committee as an additional mech-
anism in safeguarding shareholders’ interests, in order to improve the accountability and 
transparency of financial information and internal control function (Hsu & Wu, 2014). 
According to the OECD principles of corporate governance, taken over by the BSE Code, 
the corporate governance framework must ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is 
made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial statement, 
performance, ownership and governance of the company. In order to achieve this, the board 
should establish an audit committee, from among its members, to assist in the discharge of 
its responsibilities in the areas of financial reporting, internal control and risk management. 
The audit committee should be composed exclusively of non-executive directors and should 
contain a sufficient number of independent directors (Art. 7 Transparency, financial report-
ing, internal control and risk management, Principle XII, Rec. 27–29. CGC of Bucharest 
Stock Exchange, 2008, p. 11).
Further, the following hypothesis will be examined:
Hypothesis 6. The existence of Audit Committee positively influences firm performance.
3. Methodology and data
3.1. Sample
In determining the sample companies of the present study, the authors started from large 
companies publicly trading on BSE at the end of 2013 and then removed the unlisted com-
panies, the financial institutions (banks) and foreign companies listed on BSE. The final 
sample consisted of 64 large non-financial Romanian companies listed on BSE, at the end of 
2013. Data was gathered from the 2012 financial reports, available both on the companies’ 
websites and the BSE (www.bvb.ro). Board characteristics were provided by the ‘Comply or 
Explain Statement’ for the year 2012. Public companies voluntarily reported this statement 
to BSE in the first part of the following year together with the financial statements (in the 
present study, in the first part of 2013). Consequently, the valid sample was reduced to 55 
publicly-traded Romanian companies which voluntarily reported a ‘Comply or Explain 
Statement’.
The BSE adopted a new CGC based on the OECD principles of corporate governance 
in 2008, so, both corporate governance practices and the ‘Comply or Explain Statement’ 
are relatively new in Romania. Choosing the year 2012 for analysis was justified by the fact 
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that it revealed the most recent data (relating to the moment of this research) and, based 
on this, it encompassed the highest probability for corporate governance principles to be 
incorporated in their actions by Romanian companies, bearing in mind that this concept 
is relatively new in Romania.
3.2. Variables
The six hypotheses were assessed and tested, having in mind that all the six characteris-
tics (such as equilibrium between non-executive and executive members of the board of 
directors; independence of board members; selection of board members by the assistant 
role of the Nomination Committee; training the members’ competences; remuneration 
of board members by the assistant role of the Remuneration Committee; improuving the 
accountability and transparency of financial information by the assistant role of the Audit 
Committee) were easily collected from the ‘Comply or Explain Statements’ which were 
voluntarily reported by the sample companies. In order to test these hypotheses, the relation-
ships between the six board characteristics as independent variables and firm performance 
(ROA and Tobin’s Q) as the dependent variables were investigated. Two control variables 
(firm size and leverage), as we refer below, were also used.
* Independent variables – board characteristics
Equilibrium between executive and non-executive members (EQUIL)
Information regarding the equilibrium between executive and non-executive members 
(EQUIL) was obtained from the answer given by the company to the following question in 
the ‘Comply or Explain Statement’: ‘Does the structure of the Board of Directors of the com-
pany provide a balance between the executive and nonexecutive members (and especially 
independent nonexecutive directors) so that no person or group of persons may dominate 
the decision-making process of the board of directors?’. There are two possible answers – 
YES or NO. If NO, the company would have to explain the causes of such deviation. Thus, 
the value of the dummy variable is 1 if the answer is YES and 0, if it is NO.
Independence of board members (INDEP)
In the ‘Comply or Explain Statement’, companies have to answer YES or NO to the question: 
‘Does the structure of the board of directors provide a sufficient number of independent 
members?’ The value of dummy INDEP is 1 if the answer is YES and 0 if it is NO.
Training the competences of board members (TRAIN)
In the ‘Comply or Explain Statement’, companies have to answer YES or NO to the question: 
‘Do the board director members permanently improve their knowledge through training/
formation in corporate governance?’ So, the value of dummy TRAIN is 1 if the answer is 
YES and 0, if it is NO.
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Nomination Committee (NOM)
Establishment of a Nomination Committee (NOM) consisting of independent members is 
representative of an adequate remuneration policy. In the ‘Comply or Explain Statement’, 
companies have to answer YES or NO to: ‘Is there a Nomination Committee within the 
company’? The value of dummy NOM is 1 if the answer is YES and 0, if it is NO.
Remuneration Committee (REM)
Companies have to answer the following question in the ‘Comply or Explain Statement’:
‘Is there a Remuneration Committee consisting exclusively of non- executive directors?’ 
And the answer can be YES or NO, if NO, they must explain the causes of deviations. So, 
the value of dummy REM is 1 if the answer is YES and 0, if it is NO.
Audit Committee (AUDIT)
Information regarding the existence and composition of an Audit Committee (AUDIT) 
are obtained from the answer reported in the Comply or Explain Statement: ‘Is there an 
Audit Committee consisting of non-executive directors and is there a sufficient number 
of independent directors?’ Again, a YES/NO answer, if NO, explain. The value of dummy 
AUDIT is 1 if the answer is YES and 0, if it is NO.
*Dependent variable – company performances such as ROA and Tobin’s Q
Assessing the impact of board characteristics on the company’s performances is conditioned 
by the choice of the best indicators of business performance. The field’s literature divides 
them into two main groups: accounting-based measures and market-based measures. The 
first group reflects the operational performances of a company and comprises indicators 
like: liquidity, solvency, gearing, activity and profitability. The latter group incorporates 
investors’ perception on the market and is reflected by indicators such as: market capitali-
sation, price-to-earnings ratio, price to book ratio and Tobin’s Q.
Of course, each of the two categories has both advantages and multiple criticisms. 
Considering the advantages of each group of measures, both accounting and market based 
indicators will be used hereinafter for evaluating firm’s performance. Return on assets will 
be used for the operational performances of the company, while Tobin’s Q will be used for 
the market ones. Return on assets (ROA) was calculated as net result on total assets and 
Tobin’s Q as market capitalisation plus book value of debt on book value of assets. Using 
ROA and Tobin’s Q for such purpose may lead to different results (Rad et al., 2012). This is 
explained by the particular features of each indicator.
* Control variables
Firm size (SIZE) and leverage (LEV) were included in the present study as control variables 
in the process of investigating the relations between board characteristics and firm perfor-
mances. Firm size (SIZE) is often used on this position in the analysis by a great number 
of studies assessing the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
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(Bathula, 2008; Tariq, 2010; Al-Matari et al., 2012; Rechman & Ali Shah, 2013). This variable 
is computed as the natural log of total assets.
In this regard, the second control variable, Leverage (LEV), was found on this position 
in several studies dealing with the relationship between performance and various features 
of corporate governance (Hsu & Wu, 2014; Rechman & Ali Shah, 2013). According to 
Stiglitz (1985), leverage is positively associated with firm performance. It is defined as the 
ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets (Rechman & Ali Shah, 2013).
3.3. Methodology
As seen from the above, the dependent and the control variables are scale. The explanatory 
variables are all binary, constructed as dummy variables.
Apart from the descriptive methods used to assess the features of the variables, this 
research is based on evaluating correlations and interdependences that exist between these 
variables. For this, the correlation analysis based on Pearson’s coefficient was employed for 
the scale variables and the ANOVA analysis of variances was employed for the dummy ver-
sus scale variables. The authors investigated whether the board characteristic influenced the 
performance of Romanian companies, bearing in mind that issues of corporate governance 
were introduced on the Romanian market only few years ago. At the end, multiple linear 
regression analysis was employed to evaluate the overall effect of the explanatory variables 
used. Classical econometric procedures were applied to generate and validate results.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Descriptive statistics
The first way of reflecting the level of adoption of best corporate practice principles by 
companies in Romania consists of the board of directors’ concerns to prepare and report a 
‘Comply or Explain Statement’ to BSE.
According to the results from 2012, nine out of 64 companies did not report a ‘Comply 
or Explain Statement’. Therefore, 85% of the companies chose to report such a statement of 
compliance to the principles of best practices in corporate governance.
Table 1 shows the degree of achievement of the board members’ characteristics on: equilib-
rium between executive and non-executive members of the board of directors, members of 
the board of directors’ independence, training the competences of board members, the exist-
ence and operation of the company’s Nomination, Audit and Remuneration Committees 
which will assist the board of directors in taking the best decisions for the good of the 
company.
Table 1 shows that most sample companies have EQUIL, INDEP and also have concerns 
on TRAIN, while the majority of companies do not have NOM, AUDIT and REM, consti-
tuted under the independence provisions required by the code.
Table 1 reveals that for companies in the sample, there is a balance on the board’s level 
between executive and non-executive directors (and in particular, independent non-exec-
utive directors) with 80% in such a manner that no individual or small group of people can 
dominate. The result supports the agent theory according to which the best management 
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of the company is provided by non-executive directors as they respond to the interest of 
shareholders (Fama, 1980).
A percent of 61.8% of the sample companies have independent members in theirs boards 
of directors. For comparison, the study conducted by Maier (2005) showed average percent-
ages of the board’s independence on a scale that ranged from 1.5% in Germany to 81.3% in 
Switzerland. In Saudi Arabia, 76% of Saudi listed firms’ board members are independent 
(Fallatah & Dickins, 2012).
For 87.3% of the Romanian sample companies, the board of directors’ members per-
manently improved their knowledge through trainings in order to get the best qualified, to 
ensure successful governance of the company. This high percentage highlights the major 
concerns of the Romanian leaders on improving their corporate governance knowledge 
over time.
The existence of Nomination Committees focusing on most companies in the sample does 
not ensure the functioning of such committees within the company. Therefore, about 69% 
of sample companies do not have a Nomination Committee, showing that only in 31% of 
the companies such a committee was found. According to the study of Albert-Roulhac and 
Breen (2005), an average of 71% of the European companies have a Nomination Committee, 
Romania being situated far below the European average.
A major percentage of companies (61.8%) do not have a Remuneration Committee and 
therefore, 38.2% have such a committee. At the European level, the average of the companies 
having a Remuneration Committee is 94% (Albert-Roulhac & Breen, 2005), which places 
Romania far below this level. For comparison, in Saudi Arabia, only 46% of companies have 
a Remuneration Committee (Fallatah & Dickins, 2012).
According to the study of Vitezić (2006), 80% of Croatian companies did not disclose 
information on remuneration. Similarly, the present finding for Romania also highlights 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the binary variables explanatory variables.
source: authors’ calculations using sPss 19.0.
EQUIL INDEP TRAIN NOM REM AUDIT
mode 1 1 1 0 0 0
Percent of the mode 80 61.8 87.3 69.1 61.8 56.4
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the scale variables.
amultiple models exist. the smallest value is shown.
source: authors’ calculations using sPss 19.0.
ROA Tobin’s Q LEV LN LEV SIZE LN SIZE
mean -0.008 0.8414 0.4946 -.6104 1.0835E9 19.0784
median 0.0131 0.7851 0.4160 -.4573 1.5891E8 18.8839
mode -0.3082 0.1470 0.0210a -3.86a 13093573.00a 16.39a
std. Deviation 0.0988 0.3828 3.9062 1.2833 4.76646E9 1.43057
skewness -0.652 0.835 -2.375 -.085 7.297 1.175
kurtosis 1.727 0.711 26.294 .587 55.825 2.578
minimum -0.3082 0.1470 -24.0630 -3.86 13093573.00 16.39
maximum 0.2664 1.8540 17.1520 2.84 3.74E10 24.35
Percentiles 25 -0.0533 0.5867 0.1465 -1.4610 74581410.5000 18.1247
50 0.0131 0.7851 0.4160 -0.4573 1.5891E8 18.8839
75 0.0382 1.0352 1.0527 0.1706 3.5374E8 19.6837
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the low level of adopting best corporate practice in the area of remuneration policy of 
emerging European countries.
In total, 56.4% of sample companies do not have an Audit Committee (composed exclu-
sively of non-executive directors and having a sufficient number of independent directors) 
meaning that for 43.6% of sample companies, such a committee exists. According to Albert-
Roulhac and Breen’s (2005) study, approximately 94% of European companies have an Audit 
Committee. In Croatia, as an emerging European country, only 20% of the companies have 
an Audit Committee (Vitezić, 2006). When compared to European companies, the survey 
of Albert-Roulhac and Breen (2005) shows that the Audit Committee is not independent in 
52% of them. In this case, it shows that Romania is below the European average. However, 
there is a significant evolution when compared to 2010, when, according to the study con-
ducted by Feleaga et al. (2011), the percentage of companies listed on BSE, which do not 
ensure independence of the Audit Committee, was 80%.
The percentage of companies that have Audit Committees composed of non-executive 
and independent members varies from one country to another. Thus, the study conducted by 
Maier (2005) in 24 countries showed an average of 64.5% regarding the Audit Committee’s 
independence, ranging from 4% in Japan to 95% in Canada, the US, Ireland, the UK, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Surprisingly, in Saudi Arabia, a high percentage (93%) 
of the companies have an independent Audit Committee (Fallatah & Dickins, 2012).
As shown in Table 2, initial leverage and company size variables were skewed and with 
high kurtosis coefficients. Consequently, they were transformed using the natural logarithm. 
This method preserves the characteristics of data, while allowing use of the linear regression 
model. One can observe an important reduction in the skewness and kurtosis of the two var-
iables. None of the two control variables is related to ROA. Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
had significance values of 0.713 between ROA and leverage and 0.711 between ROA and the 
size of the company. Leverage is significantly correlated to firm performance when Tobin’s 
Q is used as proxy. The coefficient of 0.353 shows a direct relationship which is significant 
at the 0.01 level (Significance = 0.005 < 0.01). The size of the company remains statistically 
unrelated to performance although the significant coefficient is much lower (0.126).
4.2. Empirical results and discussion
Maybe unsurprisingly, the ANOVA analysis revealed no significant influence of the explan-
atory variables on the performance of the sample companies, neither using ROA nor Tobin’s 
Q. The results are summarised in Table 3. Consequently, none of the factors considered have 
an impact on the company’s performance when taken individually. Their multivariate impact 
on a company’s performance was also assessed. However, results in Tables 4 and 5 show 
Table 3. anova results – significance level coefficients (siG.) – synthesis.
source: own calculations using sPss 19.0.
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that only variable INDEP significantly influenced ROA, but only at the 10% significance 
level. None of the factors turned out to be significant in the case of Tobin’s Q as dependent.
Consequently, none of the six hypotheses tested was accepted. In all the cases, the 2-tailed 
Sig was much higher than 0.05. It can thus be stated that for the Romanian companies listed 
on BSE, there is no significant influence of the selected features of board characteristics on 
the firm’s performances, using neither ROA nor Tobin’s Q.
However, the signs of the coefficients can be discussed. The correlation is positive between 
EQUIL, TRAIN, NOM, AUDIT and ROA as dependent. The variables INDEP and REM 
are negatively correlated with ROA. When switching to the Tobin’s Q proxy, company’s 
performance are only positively correlated with AUDIT. All other board characteristics have 
negative coefficients. Thus, AUDIT has positive coefficient regardless of how company’s 
performance is measured.
All in all, the results emphasise that for Romanian companies, we cannot speak yet 
about a significant relationship between board characteristics and business performance. 
Additionally, the sign of the coefficients changes depending on the proxy used as dependent. 
Similar results have been obtained for different emerging markets, and will be presented 
further.
Table 4. Estimation results of the model with Roa as dependent variable.a
aDependent variable: Roa.
source: own calculations using sPss 19.0.
Model
Unstandardised coefficients Standardised coefficients
T Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1 (constant) 0.061 0.179 0.340 0.736
EQUiL 0.065 0.042 0.343 1.553 0.130
INDEP -0.064 0.034 -0.389 -1.907 0.065
tRain 0.021 0.040 0.093 0.533 0.597
nom 0.013 0.045 0.073 0.286 0.777
aUDit 0.010 0.032 0.061 0.312 0.757
REm -0.055 0.042 -0.334 -1.315 0.197
Llev -0.006 0.011 -0.090 -0.521 0.606
Lsize -0.003 0.009 -0.059 -0.367 0.716
R2 0.167
adj. R2 0.029
Table 5. Estimation results of the model with tobin’s Q, as dependent variable.a
aDependent variable: tobin’s Q.
source: own calculations using sPss 19.0.
Model
Unstandardised coefficients Standardised coefficients
T Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1 (constant) 0.410 0.729 0.563 0.577
EQUiL -0.006 0.171 -0.007 -0.033 0.974
inDEP -0.172 0.137 -0.253 -1.260 0.216
tRain -0.034 0.164 -0.035 -0.207 0.837
nom -0.136 0.183 -0.188 -0.743 0.463
aUDit 0.109 0.129 0.161 0.843 0.405
REm -0.036 0.172 -0.053 -0.210 0.835
Llev 0.072 0.043 0.282 1.663 0.105
Lsize 0.030 0.036 0.132 0.830 0.412
R2 0.194
adj. R2 0.005
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Regarding the correlation between equilibrium non-executive and executive board mem-
bers (also called non-duality) and performance, no significant correlation was found but it 
was positive in relation to ROA and negative in relation to Tobin’s Q. An important number 
of studies confirm the lack of relationship between duality or non-duality and company 
performances for emerging markets (Akpan & Amran, 2014 for Nigeria; Ehikioya, 2009; 
Moscu, 2013 for Romania; Peng, Buck, & Filatotchev, 2003 for Russia). For example, Peng 
et al. (2003) found little evidence of a positive relationship between the presence of non-ex-
ecutive board members and firm performance in a study conducted on a sample of 314 
privately-owned Russian companies. Similar results for Romania are presented in Moscu 
(2013) on a sample of 62 non-financial companies trading on BSE in 2010. She also found 
an insignificant relationship between the number of non-executive members and corporate 
performance reflected by ROA and ROE. For Nigeria, the empirical study conducted by 
Akpan and Amran (2014) on 90 sample companies listed in the Nigerian Stock Exchange, 
shows that there is no relationship between board equity and company performance (meas-
ured by turnover).
When assessing independence of directors, results pointed out a negative but also insignif-
icant relationship between this characteristic of board members and company’s performance 
which is reflected by ROA and Tobin’s Q. The results are in line with many findings of studies 
conducted on emerging countries (Korea – Choi & Hasan, 2005; Mauritius – Mahadeo 
et al., 2012; Asian emerging countries – Al-Matari et al., 2012; van Essen et al., 2012; Nigeria 
– Akpan & Amran, 2014). In Kuwait, for example, Al-Matari et al. (2012) found a negative 
but insignificant relationship between independence of board members and ROA. Similarly, 
for another emerging country such as Mauritius, Mahadeo et al. (2012) found that the pro-
portion of independent directors negatively affects return on assets. For Asian emerging 
countries, van Essen et al. (2012) also found very limited evidence of a direct relationship 
between independence of directors and firm performances but additionally, they identi-
fied significant differences among countries with respect to the correlation between the 
two variables. Thus, for Korea and Taiwan, van Essen et al. (2012) empirically found that 
more independent boards are positively correlated to firm financial performance, while in 
countries such as China, Hong Kong, India and Thailand, no significant effect was found. 
For Nigeria, the study by Akpan and Amran (2014) also found no relationship between 
board independence and company performance (measured by turnover).
Inconsistent correlations were found when the influence of training in corporate gov-
ernance on performances was assessed. Results show a positive but insignificant correla-
tion between training in corporate governance and ROA and a negative and insignificant 
correlation between training in corporate governance and Tobin’s Q. Going further, studies 
in the field which were conducted in emerging countries, found some mixed findings for 
Taiwan. Here, Yang (2009) investigated a relationship between board training hours and 
financial performance (measured by ROA, ROE and EPS), but did not find any significant 
relationships at that time (year 2008). However, several years later, Wu (2013) empirically 
found that board training has a significant positive impact on the accounting-based meas-
ures of ROA, ROE and no significant effect on the market-based measures of Tobin’s Q 
and stock returns.
The coefficient for the relationship between the existence of a Nomination Committee 
and company’s performance reveals a positive correlation with ROA and a negative corre-
lation with Tobin’s Q, but again, insignificant. Only 31% of the present study’s sample has 
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a Nomination Committee, leading to inconsistent results on the correlation involved. In 
contrast to the results of this study, consistent relationships between nomination process and 
ROA were found in developed countries by Brown (2007) and Frederick (2011). The latter 
shows that an independent nomination process boosts performances of the board even in 
the case of state-owned companies. For an emerging country, Jordan, Makhlouf et al. (2014) 
theorised a relationship between the existence of a nomination (and also a compensation) 
committee and firms’ performance, but it was not empirically tested.
Concerning the correlation between existing a Remuneration Committee and firm per-
formance, the relationship was also insignificant but negative when using both proxies of 
financial performances. Therefore, the existence of a Remuneration Committee does not 
necessarily lead to an increase in performance, but, on the contrary, may determine a drop. 
The inconsistent results of the present research are partially in accordance with various 
studies in agent theory field. Tosi et al. (2010) performed a meta-analytic review of the 
empirical literature on the determinants of CEO pay and found no inconsistent incidence 
of management remuneration on performance. These findings agree with those conducted 
for developed economies such as the US, the UK, Spain, Portugal and so on. For example, 
Ozkan (2007) found no significant relationship between firm performance and CEO com-
pensation for a sample of large UK companies. In Portugal, Fernandes (2005) found no 
relationship between board remuneration and financial performances reflected by ROA and 
ROE. In Spain, Tariq (2010) obtained a negative but insignificant relationship between remu-
neration of board members and performances reflected by ROE. However, in Europe, for 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, Müller (2014) found some mixed results 
on the relationship between board compensation characteristics. He empirically found a 
significant relationship between non-executive directors’ basic fee, fees paid in shares and 
additional remuneration for board committee membership but, the chair remuneration 
and the senior non-executive remuneration seem not to significantly influence company 
performance. For emerging markets like Kenya or Malaysia, weak or lack of relationship 
were found. For instance, in Kenya, Miyienda, Oirere, and Miyogo (2013) found a weak 
relationship between directors’ remuneration and financial performances which is reflected 
by ROE and Tobin’s Q and in Malaysia, Abdullah (2006) showed the lack of any association 
between the two variables, by using ROA. Therefore, it may be concluded that it has not yet 
been clearly demonstrated that a certain board remuneration may have better results, and 
the results of this study also confirm these findings.
When dealing with the existence of an Audit Committee (made up exclusively of non-ex-
ecutive administrators and having a sufficient number of independent ones), a positive but 
insignificant relationship was found (in both cases, ROA and Tobin’s Q). In conclusion, for 
the sample companies, having an Audit Committee in order to assist the activity of the board 
of directors does not necessarily imply a significant increase in performance. Similarly, the 
findings are supported by that of Al-Matari et al. (2012) for the emerging market of Kuwait.
5. Conclusion
The present research focuses on identifying the relationships between various board char-
acteristics and firm performances in the emerging market of Romania. Some board charac-
teristics considered to be necessary for corporate governance efficiency were selected having 
in mind, the data sources provided by ‘Comply or Explain Statement’ such as: equilibrium 
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between non-executive and executive members of the board of directors, independence of 
board members, selection and training of board members; the role played by Nomination, 
Remuneration and Audit Committees in the company’s governance. The sample of the 
present study consists of 55 Romanian non-financial companies which publicly traded on 
BSE and the data source is represented by ‘Comply or Explain Statement’ for 2012.
The added value of this research, when compared with other Romanian researches in this 
field (Gavrea et al., 2012; Moscu, 2013) affects various areas. Firstly, some board characteris-
tics which have not been analysed before in Romania, in relation to financial performances 
such as independence of board members, training the competences of board members, the 
assistant role the board provided by some committees such as Nomination, Remuneration 
and Audit Committees, were analysed.
Secondly, an original data source was used for these board characteristics, namely the 
‘Comply or Explain Statement’. Thirdly, another original value for Romania consists of 
being used as variables, measuring financial performances, a complex measure of financial 
performances, namely Tobin’s Q. It is largely used in international literature (being both 
an internal and external measure of performances) but it has not been used in Romanian 
researches on the board characteristics and financial performances nexus.
The descriptive results of this study show that a large majority of companies, ranging 
between 61.8% and 87.3%, are characterised by an equilibrium between EQUIL, INDEP 
and concern with what is regarded as TRAIN. Contrarily, a majority of the companies, 
ranging between 56.4 and 69.1% does not constitute NOM, REM and AUDIT according to 
the code provisions (consisting exclusively of non-executive and independent members).
In addition, the average values of companies that have such committees are below the 
European average, emphasising delays in the process of adopting the good corporate gov-
ernance practices in comparison with other European countries.
Further, the empirical results of the current study reveal no significant relationship 
between the six board characteristics chosen and financial performance for Romanian 
companies. None of the six working hypotheses was accepted, either with ROA or Tobin’s 
Q. With regards to the direction of the relationship, the results are quite heterogeneous. 
They reflect either a positive or a negative relationship between the six board characteristics 
and financial performance (measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q).
The results of the present study are the same with those of emerging economies relat-
ing to the inconsistent correlation between board characteristic and firm performances. 
Thus, lack of relationship between equilibrium non-executive board members are found in 
Russia (Peng et al., 2003), Nigeria (Ehikioya, 2009; Akpan & Amran, 2014) and Romania 
(Moscu, 2013). The independence of directors also had insignificant influence on financial 
performances in Korea (Choi & Hasan, 2005), Mauritius (Mahadeo et al., 2012), Nigeria 
(Akpan & Amran, 2014) and Asian emerging countries (Al-Matari et al., 2012; Vas Essen 
et al., 2012). Training in corporate governance seems not to have any influence on finan-
cial performances in Taiwan (Yang, 2009). Regarding nomination of board members for 
emerging Jordan, Makhlouf et al. (2014) only theorised a positive relationship between the 
existence of nomination (and also compensation) committee and financial performance 
but they are yet to be tested. Concerning directors’ remuneration, for emerging markets 
like Kenya or Malaysia, a weak or lack of relationship was found (Abdullah, 2006; Miyienda 
et al., 2013). Finally, the existence of an Audit Committee to assist the activity of the board of 
72   S. N. BORLEA ET AL.
directors does not necessarily imply a significant increase in performance in some emerging 
countries such as Kuwait (Al-Matari et al., 2012).
In order to show some explanations of such insignificant relationship between board 
characteristic and financial performance in the emerging countries, several findings were 
highlighted. For, instance, in Croatia, Vitezić (2006) pointed out that in the long post-com-
munist period of 15 years, some positive changes were made in managing enterprises but 
argued that, the adoption of corporate governance principles increases business perfor-
mances even though it is hard to measure the extent to which board contribute to increase 
in performance of the companies from emerging economies. He also argued that, despite 
the globalisation market, some factors such as economy development, knowledge, the soci-
ological and cultural differences in emerging economies limit the comprehensive approach, 
especially when compared with developed economies.
In emerging Asian countries, van Essen et al. (2012) found a very limited evidence of 
a direct relationship between board attributes and firm financial performance, and finally 
concluded that ‘good governance’ prescriptions for the board of directors are not applied 
to Asian firms. For Mauritius, Mahadeo et al. (2012) also found both negative and positive 
impacts of board characteristics and financial performance. Regarding the small negative 
regression coefficient of the ‘independent non-executive director’ in relation with financial 
performance (ROA), they explained that such a concept is very recent and thus, the results 
may reflect initial adaptation of the companies within such new provisions required by the 
CGC. In Romania, Moscu (2013) explained inconsistent results on the relationship between 
some board characteristic (such as the number of non-executive members) and corporate 
performance by several other constraints such as lack or poor quality of information.
In the light of the studies mentioned above in the field of board characteristics nexus 
financial performances, the results of this study are supported by two main ideas. Firstly, the 
findings for Romania’s economy are in line with those obtained for other emerging coun-
tries and they are explained by the shortcomings which characterise the lagging transition 
economies: legislation context, privatisation, ownership structure, poor quality of infor-
mation, social, cultural, political and economic structures. All these shortcomings mostly 
affect the causal relationship between board characteristics and firm performances in the 
Romanian economy. Faced with the principles of new social era of capitalism, Romania like 
other emerging countries, have to adjust their behaviour in order to show the real drives 
of economy. Secondly, the concept of corporate governance is new in Romania; it has only 
really been adopted since 2008, once with the new code of corporate governance of BSE. 
Thus, Romanian companies have not yet had enough time to apply and practice the concept 
of corporate best practices. Moreover, the new CGC of BSE, which was implemented in 
January 2016, will bring furter improvements in the field of adopting best corporate practice 
in Romania. As the principles of corporate governance will be better known and adopted 
by the emerging economy of Romania, this will serve as an avenue for future studies.
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